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Abstract
Background: The need for life-saving interventions such as mechanical ventilation may threaten to outstrip
resources during the Covid-19 pandemic. Allocation of these resources to those most likely to benefit can be
supported by clinical prediction models. The ethical and practical considerations relevant to predictions supporting
decisions about microallocation are distinct from those that inform shared decision-making in ways important for
model design.
Main body: We review three issues of importance for microallocation: (1) Prediction of benefit (or of medical
futility) may be technically very challenging; (2) When resources are scarce, calibration is less important for
microallocation than is ranking to prioritize patients, since capacity determines thresholds for resource utilization; (3)
The concept of group fairness, which is not germane in shared decision-making, is of central importance in
microallocation. Therefore, model transparency is important.
Conclusion: Prediction supporting allocation of life-saving interventions should be explicit, data-driven, frequently
updated and open to public scrutiny. This implies a preference for simple, easily understood and easily applied
prognostic models.
Keywords: Clinical prediction models, Covid-19, Healthcare rationing, Algorithmic fairness

Background
During the Covid-19 pandemic, the need for life-saving
interventions, particularly mechanical ventilation and
extracorporeal
membrane
oxygenation
(ECMO),
threatens to outstrip available resources in some settings. A cogent ‘multiprincipled’ approach to rationing
health care resources during the current crisis has been
distilled from decades of debate on the difficult subject
of microallocation of scarce health care resources [1].
First among these principles is prioritizing patients to
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save ‘the most lives and… [maximize] post-treatment
length of life.’
Yet how is this to be done? Because prognostication
by physician clinical judgment is vulnerable to myriad
cognitive biases [2] and prone to error [3, 4], and because the extreme psychological burdens of this approach to allocation of life-saving resources should be
avoided, there is an important potential role for prognostic models. Prognostic models can offer actuarial objectivity for critical decision-making, ameliorating the
influence of human biases. Many Covid-specific models
have already been developed, although an early review
indicates they have a high risk of bias [5]. In this viewpoint, we highlight methodological aspects of prediction
that are of special relevance for allocating life-preserving
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interventions and have received little attention in more
general methodological guidance for clinical prediction
modeling [6, 7]. We believe the considerations we note
may be underappreciated, as they do not apply (or may
be less salient) in more typical clinical contexts that employ prediction for shared decision-making with
patients.

from data even several months old, or in different settings, suspect. When medical futility is not well predicted, poor prognosis despite intervention may no
longer be a reliable surrogate for the probability of
benefit.

Main text

While the need for rigorous prediction modeling methodology is increasingly recognized, when prognostic
models are used for microallocation there are unique
priorities for evaluation. In more familiar settings, these
models are used to inform shared decision-making, with
the goal of aligning therapeutic options with a patient’s
personal values and preferences. In that context, ‘good
calibration’ (i.e. agreement between the proportion of
patients predicted to have an outcome in any strata and
those that actually have that outcome) is critical for effective decision-making. Yet excellent calibration—normally the Achilles heel of prediction, since it requires
consistent effects of variables not included in the model
[12, 13]—is not a critical issue for microallocation.
When the goal is to prioritize patients for scarce resources that would benefit a much larger group, (nonparametric) ranking (i.e. good discrimination) is key.
This is because, under conditions of scarcity, the decision threshold is not determined by a patient’s (or clinician’s) point of indifference (the risk at which the
utilities of alternative treatments or decisions are evenly
balanced), but by capacity. That ranking is typically sufficient for microallocation should be apparent to anyone
who has ever waited in a line for anything: it is unnecessary to know whether the person in front of you arrived
2 hours or 2 seconds before you.

Prediction of potential benefit (or of medical futility) is
technically challenging

What predictions could be useful in the setting of rationing a potentially life-saving but scarce resource?
Under a utilitarian framework, the prediction of interest
is the probability of benefit (i.e. probable outcomes with
versus without ventilator support). However, forecasting
causal counterfactuals is almost impossible to do reliably
from non-randomized data [8]. Instead, prognosis is
used as an imperfect surrogate to predict the potential
for benefit.
While more generally it is assumed that patients at
highest risk derive the most benefit from medical interventions, amongst the critically ill, this assumption is
turned on its head: medical futility (i.e. dismal prognosis
despite maximal therapy) is typically thought to be the
most useful prediction for withholding of scarce critical
care resources. This approach relies on an implicit assumption of uniformly poor outcomes in the absence of
intervention.
However, medical futility—like benefit—is also technically very difficult to predict with sufficient confidence
in most clinical circumstances [9]. Schneiderman and
colleagues proposed a quantitative definition of futile interventions as those that have proved useless in the last
100 cases [10], such that the physician can be confident
that no more than 3% of patients would survive. However, in almost all clinical contexts, models designed to
predict futility fall far short of these rigorous specifications [9]. This is a particular limitation in a medical crisis such as the current Covid-19 pandemic in which data
is relatively sparse and still being collected.
Further, data used for model development may reflect
informal rationing at the bedside, whereby the perceived
poor prognosis in the old and the sick leads to less aggressive care—a so-called self-fulfilling prophecy [11].
Accurate prediction of futility requires prediction of outcome given maximal care, which may not be available in
the data for some risk strata.
Finally, clinical practice during the Covid-19 pandemic
is evolving. More frequent use of proning, minimizing
paralytics, use of lung-protective volumes for ventilation,
early physical therapy and other treatments (such as
remdesivir) may improve prognosis over time. This
learning curve can make prediction of medical futility

Calibration is less important for rationing than for shared
decision-making or counseling

Fairness concerns that are not an issue when using
prediction for shared decision-making emerge in the
context of rationing; transparency is critical

Finally, there are a set of ‘fairness’ issues that come to
the fore with rationing that are not germane in the usual
shared decision-making or counseling context. Fairness
concerns arise when predictions are used to adjudicate
between competing interests (for example, between two
patients requiring the same ventilator)—rather than to
align a decision with a patient’s own values and preferences [14]. In these circumstances, predictions can be
said to be ‘polar’—i.e. one pole of the probability prediction is associated with a decision that is unambiguously
favorable, such that it is in the subject’s interest to get a
higher (or lower) score, rather than an accurate forecast.
While models can help provide an objective basis for
microallocation, they do not fully alleviate issues of
group fairness. For example, age and sex are important
determinants of actuarial functions, such as mortality
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risk and life expectancy, which may provide a basis for
microallocation. If each year of life is valued similarly for
all, clinical prediction will systematically prioritize treatment for the young over the old and presumably, in
Covid-19 infection, for women over men. It is also not
hard to see how such actuarial functions might differentially allocate resources across different racial or ethnic
groups—given influential social determinants of health
and other race-correlated factors—which might disadvantage historically marginalized groups. These fairness
concerns may be exacerbated by machine learning approaches that are (1) highly dimensional (potentially
making use of many variables that might function as
proxies for race, ethnicity or sex) and (2) not open to
scrutiny by clinicians, regulators or the general public.
The field of algorithmic fairness has generated interesting scholarly work, but is not fully mature for application in this crisis [14].

Conclusions
The above considerations suggest allocation methods
should be explicit, data-driven, frequently updated and
open to public scrutiny [15]. This latter quality argues
for the use of simple and interpretable prognostic
models—rather than increasingly popular ‘black box’
machine learning approaches, including many proposed
in the context of Covid-19 [5].
While development of accurate clinical prediction
models is important to ensure that the greatest benefit
can be derived from a limited supply of life-saving resources, we should acknowledge that there will not be a
perfect technical solution to this problem or a single best
method of resource allocation [16, 17]. Nevertheless,
when withdrawing or withholding life-saving care from
patients who might potentially benefit, professional societies should aim for standardization and consensus in
their guidance. It goes without saying that we hope such
guidance need not be applied.
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